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Companies and their investors have been battling over the
value of representative shareholder litigation since at least the 1940s.1
Investors argue that managerial agency costs are high and that class
actions and derivative suits are key shareholder monitoring
mechanisms that they can deploy to keep managers in line.
Companies, on the other hand, believe that the plaintiffs' bar drives
representative litigation claims, as agency costs in contingency fee
suits make the lawyer the real party in interest. 2 Over the past
several decades, there have been numerous skirmishes between these
two sets of actors, manifesting themselves, for example, in
congressional debates over the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA") in 1995. Yet, even though one side or the other may
temporarily gain the upper hand, the war continues today unabated.
The latest battleground of this extended fight is
multijurisdictional deal litigation. Many merger-and-acquisition
("M&A") transactions attract shareholder litigation challenging the
fairness of the economic terms of the deal for the target shareholders. 3
Since the end of the financial crisis, however, the number of
jurisdictions in which shareholders attack each individual transaction
has increased.4 The potential for multijurisdictional litigation over a
single deal arises because of the existing rules of civil procedure.
Shareholders that wish to challenge the proposed terms of an M&A
transaction can sue in either a state or federal court located in either
the target company's state of incorporation or the location of the
company's headquarters (assuming the defendants have the necessary
presence in the jurisdiction). While the internal affairs doctrine
dictates that the governing law for such a suit is that of the state of
incorporation,5 courts outside of that state have long entertained M&A
1. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 141, 149 (2004).
2. Id. at 148-49.
3. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder
Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1764-65
(2012).
4. ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: MARCH
2012 UPDATE 7-8 (2012), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/03dde9O-ce88-
4 4 52-a58a-b9efcc32ed71/Recent-Developments-in-Shareholder-Litigation-Invo.aspx; Matthew D.
Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, at 3 (Feb. 2, 2012) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998482.
5. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (recognizing the long-
standing doctrine).
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suits where the filing shareholder has appropriately established
jurisdiction by simply applying the incorporating state's law.6 Thus, if
two different investors choose to file complaints in two different state
courts, perhaps one in Delaware (a frequent state of incorporation)
and another in New York (a frequent headquarters state), then, while
both the Delaware and the New York courts may have jurisdiction to
hear the case, only Delaware law would apply to determine the
validity of the investors' concerns.
Undoubtedly, there has been a marked increase in
multijurisdictional litigation since 2007. For example, Cain and
Davidoff found that the percentage of large deals that have been
challenged in multiple jurisdictions rose from 38.7% to 94.2% from
2005 to 2011.7 At the same time, there has also been a shift in
shareholder litigation settlement terms, moving away from an
increase in deal consideration towards more disclosure-based
settlements. This trend is potentially disturbing because in these
settlements, while the plaintiffs' attorneys are awarded attorneys'
fees, the target investors only receive the uncertain benefit of
increased deal disclosures. Some commentators have claimed these
are inferior settlements, indicative of a low-value lawsuit.
Why has this upsurge in multijurisdictional litigation
occurred? How significant are its real costs and benefits? And what
should we do about it, if anything? This Article first summarizes what
we know about these questions and then offers its own viewpoint on
how best to respond to multijurisdictional litigation. It finds that
different scholars have diagnosed the underlying causes for the
change in filing patterns differently. One group of academics claims
that multijurisdictional litigation initially arose because plaintiffs' law
firms perceived that Delaware had become more hostile to shareholder
litigation.8 A second set of scholars claims that changes in plaintiffs'
law firm structure, legal shifts affecting federal securities law class
actions, and Delaware's new lead-plaintiff rules are the primary
reasons for the change.9 In fact, the phenomena described by both
groups of commentators may have contributed to the observed change
in filing patterns.
On the costs and benefits associated with multijurisdictional
litigation, there are again very different views, depending on where
6. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1779, 1779 n.135.
7. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 2.
8. John Armour et al., Delaware's Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1366-70 (2012); John
Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 647 (2012)
[hereinafter Armour et al., Delaware Cases].
9. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1774-78, 1780.
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one sits. The defense bar argues that these suits have vastly increased
the transaction costs of completing deals without producing any
offsetting benefits. Others are skeptical about these claims of
enormous costs, while also finding benefits to investors from
continuing to have a choice of forum. The lack of good empirical data
identifying these costs and benefits makes it difficult to resolve the
dispute, but I have argued elsewhere that, at present, it seems the
costs are relatively low and not out of line with the benefits.'0
Where you stand on the costs and benefits of these suits affects
what you think needs to be done about them. As a result, the
proposals for responding to the uptick in multijurisdictional litigation
fall into two distinct groups. On one side, the defense bar and their
academic supporters want to eliminate shareholders' choice of forum
by either mandating that only the state of incorporation is a proper
venue or, alternatively, vesting the choice of venue with the target
company's board of directors. A corollary aspect of these proposals
rests on whether the proponents believe that a bylaw passed solely by
the board of directors is sufficient to implement such a change or that
a shareholder-approved charter amendment is needed.
However, on the other side, there are judges, academics, and
investors who believe the current system of judicial comity is
appropriate, either as it is now or with some tweaks. These advocates
see value in the current emphasis on federalism and comity, while at
the same time differing over whether a thumb needs to be put on the
scale in favor of the state of incorporation or greater coordination
among judges in different courts. This Article argues that comity is
the best solution, at least until scholars develop more complete data
on multijurisdictional litigation's costs and benefits.
However, if the noticeable decline in the quality of the
underlying suits challenging M&A transactions, evidenced by the
resultant increase in disclosure-based settlements, is the real impetus
for this debate, then courts in all jurisdictions should respond by
denying expedited discovery in, or dismissing outright, weak
shareholder class actions and derivative suits, particularly those that
allege only disclosure violations in arm's length acquisitions."
10. Id. at 1800, 1800 n.253.
11. Not all disclosure claims are weak, however. For example, the Delaware courts have
focused on insuring the disclosure of certain categories of information in deal litigation such as a
fair summary of the substantive work performed by target company investment bankers in
rendering their fairness opinions. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 201-
04 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 448-49 (Del. Ch. 2002). If
the courts would identify these necessary classes of documents more carefully, and then limit the
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Moreover, judges should not hesitate to cut or deny fees in disclosure-
based settlements where they find that the resultant change to the
disclosures is of little value to investors. If all courts would apply
these principles in approaching multijurisdictional litigation without
concern for where these cases finally wind up being resolved, there
should be little need to change the whole litigation system in ways
that may adversely affect investors.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II provides an
overview of the recent history of M&A litigation as it has changed over
the past thirty years. Section III then details the causes, costs, and
benefits of multijurisdictional litigation. Next, Section IV compares
the two most widely proposed policy responses to multijurisdictional
litigation: forum-selection clauses and comity. It concludes that, on
balance, a comity-based response is preferable, at least for now.
Section V offers some brief concluding remarks.
II. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Representative shareholder deal litigation comes in two basic
flavors: class actions and derivative suits. In the M&A context, class
actions are by far the most common type of suit.12 The typical
acquisition-oriented class action alleges that, if the transaction is a
friendly one, the target company's board of directors sold the company
for too low a price, or if the offer is a hostile one, that target
management refused to sell the company at a premium price.
Derivative suits, on the other hand, typically claim that a company's
board of directors took some action that adversely affected the firm's
value and thereby lowered the company's stock price. However,
derivative suits are less frequent in the deal area because plaintiffs
face procedural barriers in those cases that are not present in class
actions.13
This Section traces the evolution of M&A litigation and the role
of the acquisition-oriented class action over the period of 1975 to the
present. In particular, it describes the changing role of these suits
since the Fourth Merger Wave.
corporation's disclosure obligations to these types of information, they would able to more clearly
delineate what it is necessary for companies to disclose in deal litigation.
12. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 1, at 135.
13. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1784-85.
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A. Forum Shopping in the Fourth Merger Wave (1975-1989)
During the "Golden Age" of shareholder litigation, 14 the Fourth
Merger Wave that ran from 1975 to 1989, there were large numbers of
hostile takeovers.15 These deals frequently spurred both the target
and the bidder to file suits that sought to further each of these
participant's tactical goals. 16 Bidders would ask the courts to strike
down the target's defenses under state law and would challenge the
accuracy of the target company's disclosures under federal law. If the
target was a Delaware corporation, the bidder would routinely file in
the Delaware Chancery Court as quickly as possible to fix the forum
that would determine what defenses the target could use and how it
could use them in responding to the unsolicited takeover proposal.
Targets would respond as quickly as possible by filing their
own suit in their hometown state court. They would ask the court to
permit the use of their defenses as they pleased or try to impede the
bid in a variety of ways, such as alleging that the bidder had violated
federal securities laws. The target's hope was that the judge would be
more sympathetic to its situation given the large number of local
workers that it employed.
The ensuing race to the courthouse would inevitably lead to a
flurry of jurisdictional motions as each side tried to stay the other
side's case in favor of their own suit. This blatant forum shopping was
widespread and generally acknowledged as a necessary part of most
hostile transactions because of the high stakes that attached to fixing
the forum in the preferred venue. While there may have been
occasional grumbling about these preliminary procedural jousts, no
one seriously argued that either party should be denied its shot at
getting into its preferred venue. Forum shopping, while not openly
14. Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiffs Motion to Expedite and the Court's Ruling at
10, Stourbridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Bersoff, C.A. No. 7300-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2012/04/stourbridge-teleconference-motion-to-expedite
.pdf (stating that the Delaware Chancery Court's corporate litigation practice had "been through
a somewhat apocryphal Golden Age in which the plaintiffs challenging public company M&A
transactions were principally competing bidders seeking merits relief to help them overcome
barriers to an alternative and higher-value transaction that was nevertheless opposed by target's
fiduciaries").
15. RONALD J. GILsoN & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 11 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2003-2004).
16. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 151, 152 (1985); Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 110, 120-22 (1986).
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lauded, was embraced as part of the best lawyers' arsenal of
appropriate litigation tactics.17
In these hostile deals, shareholders would routinely file class
actions, but they were widely viewed as ancillary to the bidder-target
suits. In some cases, such as Time-Warner,18 the bidder gave the
plaintiff shareholders a shot at arguing some of the harder claims,
either because it thought the claims were unwinnable or because it
believed that its overall case benefitted from having investors
standing by its side. However, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in Time-Warner to overrule the Interco case19 changed things. Time-
Warner permits a target almost unbridled discretion to use a poison
pill, resulting in the near demise of the hostile tender offer and paving
the way for shareholder litigation to assume greater prominence.
B. Shareholder Litigation in the Fifth Merger Wave (1993-2001)
By the late 1990s, hostile takeovers gave way to friendly
mergers. 20 Bidders used more stock to consummate these transactions
as the booming stock market resulted in huge market-price run-ups.
There was a massive surge in deal activity;21 however, because these
deals were almost all friendly, there was little bidder and target
rivalry, so bidder-target litigation dwindled to a trickle.22 This left a
need for some alternative mechanism to police the fairness of these
deals.
Recent empirical research shows that shareholder
representative actions filled the void.23 Class actions and derivative
suits appeared in about 12% of all deals.24 On average, these suits had
some teeth: they made it harder for bidders to complete deals but had
a positive effect on premiums in completed deals. About one-third of
17. Herbert M. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 BUS. LAW. 1433, 1434-
35 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner), 571 A.2d 1140, 1142
(Del. 1989). Plaintiff shareholders argued that the target's actions violated the Revlon doctrine,
whereas the bidder, Paramount Communications, claimed that the target's actions were
inappropriate under the Unocal test. Id.
19. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(forcing rare board redemption of poison pill).
20. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 15, at 17.
21. Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S.
Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799, 799 (2000).
22. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP.
FIN. 1248, 1249, 1253 (2012).
23. Id. at 1264.
24. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Jurisdictional Effects in M&A Litigation, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2277878.
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these cases settled, and in about 40% of those settlements, investors
received an increase in the deal consideration. 25
Representative litigation during this time period was largely
filed in a single venue: either in a state or federal court located in the
target's state of incorporation or headquarters state. Delaware state
courts had the lion's share of all of these cases (over 52%), with other
state courts garnering a little less than half (roughly 42%) and federal
courts seeing only a small fraction (around 6%).26 There was almost no
multijurisdictional litigation (only 3.34% of all cases), with about half
of this handful of cases filed in both Delaware and a second state,
while the remaining half involved a federal suit and a state-court
action. 27
These results provide a baseline measure of the effectiveness of
shareholder litigation in its so-called "Silver Age."28 During that
period, there was little multijurisdictional litigation occurring. A
significant percentage of deals, but well less than a majority, involved
litigation, and representative suits had an economically beneficial
impact for shareholders. 29 Settlements occurred regularly, frequently
increasing the deal price paid to target company shareholders. 30
Shareholder litigation, in other words, was a useful mechanism for
policing the agency costs of management.
C. A Changing Role for Representative Litigation in the Post-Financial
Crisis Period (2007-2012)
The financial crisis of 2007 significantly changed the economics
of dealmaking. Financing for deals dried up overnight, and the future
prospects of many potential targets became much less certain in light
of the serious recession that ensued. Strategic buyers grew skittish
about making big bets on the future of their industry. Private-equity
buyers could not find debt financing for new deals, held far too many
shaky investments in firms they bought before the crisis, and were
25. Id. (manuscript at 3-4).
26. Id. (manuscript at 31).
27. Id.
28. Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiffs Motion to Expedite and the Court's Ruling at
14, Stourbridge Invs. LLC v. Bersoff, C.A. No. 7300-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2012/04/stourbridge-teleconference-motion-to-expedite.
pdf (stating that Chancellor Allen had set the standard for expedited injunction hearings "during
the nineties, which were perhaps equally apocryphal but still something of a Silver Age in which
when stockholders sought to litigate without a covering bid, they actually wanted to get merits
relief and tried to obtain an injunction").
29. Krishnan et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 9, 11).
30. Id. (manuscript at 24-25).
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reluctant to close on new ones as their exit options from prior deals,
such as the IPO market, tanked. Overall, there was a sharp decline in
the number of deals completed after 2007.31
Fewer deals and a flurry of adverse court decisions closed down
the hostile-transaction market. The Delaware Chancery Court's
decision in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.3 2 and the
Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Versata Enterprises v. Selectica,
Inc.3 3 made it exceedingly difficult for an unsolicited bidder to gain
control of a Delaware target company that has both a poison pill and a
classified board.34 The decline in hostile deals means fewer
accompanying bidder-target suits over their terms. However,
representative shareholder M&A litigation could potentially still have
an important role in policing the terms of friendly deals during the
post-financial crisis period.
Yet, critics claim that there has been a significant and
undesirable shift in representative shareholder litigation. They point
to three changes in this area: first, an increase in the percentage of
large deals being attacked by shareholder litigation; second, a big
upswing in the amount of multijurisdictional deal litigation; and third,
a high percentage of settled cases with increased disclosure policies as
the only corporate concession. With respect to the first point, Cain and
Davidoff have shown that in the post-financial crisis period the
number of deals has dropped dramatically, while the number of suits
attacking deals has been relatively unchanged. 35 As a result, the
percentage of deals that are challenged in litigation has increased, but
the amount of litigation is largely static. Professor Thompson and I
have argued elsewhere that this is consistent with plaintiffs' law firms
having a fixed amount of litigation capacity over this time period and
therefore continuing to file roughly the same number of cases both
before and after the financial crisis. The key point, though, is that the
31. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 2 (showing that 249 deals were completed in 2007,
71 in 2009, and 124 in 2010).
32. 16 A.3d 48, 54, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) (upholding Delaware precedent regarding takeover
defenses and holding that a board of directors, not shareholders, has the power to defeat an
inadequate hostile tender offer).
33. 5 A.3d 586, 607 (Del. 2010) (upholding board's business judgment in adopting and
implementing poison pill).
34. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill:
Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 1102 n.115, 1126 (2012).
35. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 2. Cain and Davidoff find that there were 230 large
deals in 2006, of which 97 were challenged by shareholder litigation for a 42.2% litigation rate,
whereas in 2011, there were 103 large deals, with 97 being targeted by shareholder litigation, for
a 94.2% litigation rate. Id. Note that the number of suits in 2006 is exactly the same as the
number of suits in 2011. Id.
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numbers do not represent a significant increase in the total amount of
deal litigation.
The sharp uptick in multijurisdictional litigation and the rise
in disclosure-based settlements is also well documented. For 1999 and
2000, Krishnan et al. found that only 3.3% of deal litigation occurred
in multiple jurisdictions.36 Cain and Davidoff have shown that,
subsequently, in 2005, only 8.6% of deals were challenged by
multijurisdictional litigation, and that, one year later, the percentage
had increased to 25.8%. These numbers continued to climb until 2010,
when the percentage of deals targeted by multijurisdictional cases had
grown to 47.6%.37 This is a clear shift in litigation-filing patterns.
Settlement patterns appear to have changed as well. Whereas
Krishnan et al. found that about one-third of deal cases settled in 1999
and 2000, with 42% of those resulting in increased consideration for
shareholders and 18.5% involving disclosure claims, Cain and
Davidoff's more recent data show a starkly different situation.38 In
their 2005 data, disclosure-based settlements constituted about 63.9%
of all settlements; by 2011, that number rose to 79.5%.39
Generally speaking, disclosure-based settlements are viewed as
less valuable to target company shareholders than increased deal
consideration. As Vice Chancellor Laster observed recently, "[T]he
increase in disclosure-only settlements is troubling. Disclosure claims
can be settled cheaply and easily, creating a cycle of supplementation
that confers minimal, if any, benefits on the class."40
Cain and Davidoffs data also. show a difference in attorneys'
fee awards between the two types of cases: the median value for
disclosure-only settlements varies between $400,000 to $575,000 over
the 2005 to 2011 period, while the median for nondisclosure
settlements ranges from $725,000 to $3.875 million. 41
What should we make of these changes? As discussed below,
the implications seem clear to the defense side of the table: this is
forum shopping of the worst kind. Unlike during the Fourth Merger
Wave, however, where forum shopping was viewed as part and parcel
of an aggressive legal strategy employed by Wall Street firms
36. Krishnan et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 3, 25).
37. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 2. Cain and Davidoff find a small decline in 2011 with
the percentage dropping to 47.4%. Id.
38. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012, at 3 (Feb. 1,
2013) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2216727.
39. See id. (framing data in terms of nondisclosure settlements).
40. Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite and the Court's Ruling,
supra note 14, at 11-12.
41. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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representing both bidders and targets, the defense bar now represents
only defendant-corporations. As a result, it is now in the self-interest
of these firms' corporate clients to claim that multijurisdictional
litigation is an abusive forum-shopping technique. Wall Street defense
firms have strongly argued in favor of their corporate clients adopting
forum-selection provisions, either in the corporations' charters or
bylaws, neglecting to mention that this would simply reverse the
forum shopping in their clients' own favor.
Other commentators have been more cautious. Our federalist
system has long fostered the horizontal interaction of sister state
courts as well as the vertical back and forth between state and federal
courts. Overturning hundreds of years of this existing practice simply
as a response to what may well be a passing fad should only be done
after careful consideration. The existing system of comity between
courts has, in these commentators' eyes, much to commend. At the
same time, some of them propose minor tinkering with the system.
Before analyzing the potential solutions, though, it is important to
look first at the reasons why multijurisdictional litigation has grown
so dramatically in recent years and at what its real costs and benefits
are.
III. WHAT ARE THE CAUSES, COSTS, AND BENEFITS OF
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL LITIGATION?
The importance of this new trend toward increasing amounts of
multijurisdictional litigation depends on the underlying reasons why
it is occurring and its costs and benefits to society. The first Section
here, Part III.A, addresses the current theories that seek to explain
the development of this phenomenon, while the second Section, Part
III.B, critically examines its costs and benefits.
A. Why Has Multijurisdictional Litigation Developed Now?
The origins of the upsurge in multijurisdictional litigation have
been the subject of several recent law review articles. As discussed
below, they suggest that changes in the structure of plaintiffs' law
firms, new procedural rules in some courts, and competition between
courts are likely causes of this development. However, the groundwork




1. Matsushita Encourages It
Multijurisdictional representative litigation became much more
attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers after the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein.42 Briefly
stated, the Supreme Court held that "a broadly written settlement
release in an action in one jurisdiction controlled settlements made
later in other jurisdictions."43 Ultimately, this regime allowed large
payouts for the plaintiffs' firms in the settling jurisdictions while also
giving defendants incentives to settle with one class representative
over another.
Matsushita allows plaintiffs that have been left out of deal
litigation in a first court (often Delaware) to file suit in a second court
(federal or another state) in order to try and gain control over the
entire litigation, or at least regain a seat at the settlement table in the
first jurisdiction. 44 After establishing control over the dispute in the
second court, plaintiffs' counsel in the second suit may be able to
convince the defendants to settle the second action by leveraging the
release of claims in both cases. Inevitably, defendant firms will
pressure all plaintiffs' firms into participating in a global settlement,
thereby providing a fee recovery to all firms while eroding the return
of those initial plaintiffs' firms with the largest amounts of time and
money invested in bringing the litigation.45
The possibility of multiple suits and the incentives of plaintiffs'
lawyers give defendants both a powerful role in determining which
suits are settled and an opportunity to play one plaintiff
representative against another. Defendants may run a reverse
auction, in which competing plaintiffs' counsel offer to settle their
suits at the lowest price.46 This type of behavior will adversely affect
those plaintiffs' law firms that invest substantial resources in
pursuing strong cases against defendants, as their competitors that
have made little litigation investment in other jurisdictions will be
willing to settle for a lower price.
42. 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
43. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1766.
44. Id. at 1780.
45. Id. at 1769.
46. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 10-12, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology
Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.
delawarelitigation.com/uploads/file/int53(1).pdf- see Peter E. Kazanoff, Multi-Jurisdictional
Shareholder Challenges to M&A Transactions, in M&A LITIGATION 2011, at 5 (Practising Law
Inst. ed., 2011) ("With plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions, defense counsel charged with ensuring
deal certainty may be motivated to negotiate and reach a settlement with plaintiffs' counsel who
are the most willing to settle their claim and forgo a preliminary injunction hearing.").
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2. Newer and Smaller Plaintiffs' Law Firms Have Incentives to Bring
This Type of Case
Smaller and newer plaintiffs' law firms have limited financial
resources, so they want to get profitable cases without investing large
amounts of resources in each one. This makes multijurisdictional deal
litigation a good candidate for these firms because it does not require
the multimillion-dollar financial investment necessary to bring a
federal securities law class action to trial. These firms may also lack
the reputation and resources to attract the larger shareholders they
need to qualify as lead plaintiffs in these class actions. By comparison,
they can file M&A actions cheaply in either state or federal courts
located in the target's state of incorporation or those in the state
where the company's headquarters is located. After Matsushita, if
plaintiffs' firms have a case in one of those competing jurisdictions,
they can offer settlement of their case to eliminate any rival actions in
competing jurisdictions. If these firms can establish themselves as
lead counsel in an action in any one of these jurisdictions, they will
have substantial leverage to get at least part of any attorneys' fee
award paid in a global settlement of all the competing cases.
In addition, some features of Delaware's jurisprudence may
disfavor smaller, newer firms in Delaware-based actions. For example,
Delaware courts' approach to lead-plaintiff selection now largely
tracks that of the PSLRA.47 Thus, attorneys whose shareholder-clients
do not have the largest financial stake, or who otherwise do not have
some expertise that merits their selection by the Chancery Court, will
be unlikely to be appointed lead counsel in that state. Courts outside
Delaware will be attractive to plaintiffs' law firms excluded from the
Delaware litigation or shunted to a less influential position with a
smaller share of attorneys' fees. 48 Multijurisdictional filings may
enable enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys' participation in settlements
that otherwise would have been forestalled in Delaware courts.
Changes at the prominent plaintiffs' firm Milberg Weiss may
have also contributed to the incentives of younger firms to file
multijurisdictional litigation. The firm's split into east and west coast
divisions became even more complicated when several partners were
convicted of criminal charges related to their representation of clients
47. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1780.
48. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1089-90 (2013). Griffith and Lahav note that the Delaware lead-plaintiff
provision may also have the effect of pushing plaintiffs to file elsewhere if the Delaware courts
are slow to select a lead plaintiff.
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in class actions. 49 These changes undercut Milberg Weiss's impact on
the plaintiffs' services market. Subsequently, Lerach Coughlin, a
spinoff of Millberg Weiss, was thought by some to have begun filing
more suits outside of Delaware.50 The development of a more diverse
plaintiffs' bar may signal that these attorneys are more comfortable
outside of Delaware courts than their predecessors.
3. Courts Compete to Attract These Cases
Some commentators have argued that Delaware courts are in a
losing competition for deal-litigation cases with other courts.51
Delaware, they say, has manifested an antiplaintiff bias, leading
many plaintiffs to file elsewhere. In response, Delaware judges,
supposedly trying to reverse this trend, are raising attorneys' fee
awards to encourage plaintiffs to come back. There is some empirical
support for this claim: recently, Delaware courts have awarded fees
that are on average $400,000 to $500,000 higher than other courts. 52
But this may change over time, as Delaware judges have fluctuated
over the years in their attitudes toward attorneys' fee awards in deal
litigation. 53
One factor that pushes plaintiffs' attorneys to other
jurisdictions is that Chancery Court judges often refuse to defer to
49. Heidi Moore, Double Trouble, DAILY DEAL, May 10, 2004, available at LexisNexis
(announcing the breakup of the Milberg Weiss firm).
50. Vice-Chancellor Laster stated in a hearing that "when Lerach Coughlin, the predecessor
of Robbins Geller, split off from Milberg, they said, as their business plan, we are going to sue
elsewhere. We're not going to sue in Delaware." Transcript of Motion to Consolidate and
Organize Counsel and the Court's Ruling at 19, In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6084-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.delawarelitigation.
com/uploads/file/ int76(2).pdf. However, in an email to the author, one of the partners of that
firm stated that this was an incorrect statement, that the firm files suits in Delaware as well as
other jurisdictions, and that the firm is unaware of any statement otherwise by any employee of
the firm.
51. Armour et al., Delaware Cases, supra note 8, at 607; see also Brian JM Quinn,
Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 137, 143 (2011) (discussing the role of the natural pressures of the plaintiffs' bar in
reducing shareholder litigation filed in Delaware); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition,
Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 61 (2009)
(arguing that the Delaware courts' hold on corporate cases is under pressure "horizontally" due
to claims being litigated in other states' courts).
52. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 5; see also Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiffs
Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Rulings of the Court, In re S. Peru
Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011) (C.A. No 961-CS) (awarding
$150 million in attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel).
53. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation 31 (Jan. 31, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758.
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parties' settlement agreements and may reduce fee 'awards in some
actions.54 As a consequence, other state courts may compete for filings
by actually deferring more often to the parties' settlement numbers.55
But why would Delaware want to get more M&A litigation?
Delaware judges already have substantial prestige and influence
stemming from sitting on the business court of the nation. Their
dockets are very busy, and none of the judges seem to be lacking for
things to do. Perhaps they are concerned that the state will lose
companies, a significant concern in a state where corporate fees
account for 15% to 20% of the state's budget.56 Furthermore, it seems
hard to believe that Delaware judges care all that much about most
M&A deal litigation these days, as they have publicly disparaged the
quality of many of the cases being filed. 57
If competition for these cases actually exists, a rational
plaintiffs' counsel would use a number of factors to determine the
most advantageous forum in which to file. Those with strong cases
would like to have an experienced and knowledgeable judge who
issues predictable and speedy decisions without any perceived biases
for or against plaintiffs.5 8 In other words, good cases are likely to
migrate to the Delaware courts.59 Weaker cases, however, are more
likely to go elsewhere, in an effort to find a more hospitable home. For
example, *a sympathetic hometown judge where the company is
headquartered may rule in the plaintiffs' favor if the deal at issue is
likely to result in large-scale layoffs of employees or the closing of
their executive offices within the state. Or, a judge that rarely sees
corporate cases may inadvertently misapply Delaware law to reach a
plaintiff-friendly result.
Analytically, we get more traction by looking at
multijurisdictional litigation as arising because different courts have
different advantages for plaintiffs. Consider speed of resolution as one
54. Pamela S. Tikellis, Under the Microscope - Disclosure Based Settlements and Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation, in M&A LITIGATION 2011, supra note 46, at 95, 97 (noting that the
Delaware Chancery Court is reducing fee awards in disclosure-only settlements in recent years,
even when the amount of the award is unopposed).
55. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1773.
56. ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 117 (2d ed. 2010).
57. Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiffs Motion to Expedite and the Court's Ruling,
supra note 14, at 11-12 (expressing strong reservations about the quality of recent M&A deal
litigation). Some commentators have even suggested that multijurisdictional litigation presents
Delaware with an opportunity to engage in "strategic outsourcing," whereby Delaware is able to
"reduce administrative costs and conserve judicial resources for deployment in those cases most
likely to chart the future path of corporate law." Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at 1098.
58. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1771.




such possible difference. The Chancery Court often grants plaintiffs'
motions for expedited proceedings. In deal cases, this is critical if the
plaintiff seeks to obtain an injunction to stop the deal, or at least to
use as leverage to force the defendants to settle in order to eliminate
the threat of such an injunction.60 But not all other courts have such
policies, especially federal courts.
Other important procedural practices vary between courts. One
peculiarity of Delaware practice in merger cases is the Chancery
Court's unwillingness to schedule preliminary injunction hearings
before the defendants send their proxy statements to the target's
shareholders. 61 Although there are good reasons for this reluctance,
other state and federal courts may prefer to move forward without
waiting on the delivery of the proxy statements. Along similar lines,
Delaware courts are normally unwilling to enjoin a transaction in
which no other bidder has come forward. 62 Other jurisdictions may be
willing to offer plaintiffs this possibility. Furthermore, the Delaware
Chancery Court does not permit juries, whereas other jurisdictions do,
and if plaintiffs seek to try the case, that may influence their choice of
jurisdiction.63
In addition, even before the PSLRA was enacted, Delaware
traditionally did not permit discovery before a motion to dismiss in
derivative suits. This lack of available discovery makes it difficult for
the plaintiffs case to get off the ground.64 On the other hand, other
states' rules are not always as hostile to plaintiffs, and, under current
law, competing states can apply their own procedural rules regardless
of the substantive law that the internal affairs doctrine mandates.65
Finally, of course, there is always the age-old problem that
some plaintiffs' law firms may believe that particular judges will be
more sympathetic to their cause than others. It is easy to think of
examples: attorneys may believe that judges will favor former law
clerks or major campaign contributors. 66 All courts employ law clerks,
60. Id. at 1772.
61. Id.
62. In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 452 (Del. Ch. 2012).
63. However, very few cases actually go to trial, especially in deal litigation.
64. Generally, the Chancery Court has also looked askance at plaintiffs seeking documents
they may need to pursue securities fraud class actions. See Beiser v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., C.A. No.
3893-VCL, 2009 WL 483321, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2009) (denying plaintiffs request for such
documents where the plaintiff had already filed a securities fraud class action using the same
counsel as in the Delaware action).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. d (1971) ("[A] court under
traditional and prevailing practice will apply its own state's rules involving process, pleadings,
joinder of parties, and the administration of the trial . . .
66. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1773.
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but many judges, including those that sit on the Delaware Chancery
Court, are not elected.
In the end, all of these factors may have contributed to the rise
of multijurisdictional litigation. While the origins of these suits are
important, perhaps more important is determining what their costs
and benefits are. We turn to that question next.
B. What Are the Costs and Benefits of Multijurisdictional M&A
Litigation?
The costs and benefits of multijurisdictional litigation are
difficult to quantify with any precision. Beginning with the benefits
side of the equation, there are several rationales for keeping the
existing system in place. First, the current regime conforms to the
traditional jurisdiction and venue rules for forum selection. 67 Our civil
procedure system has endured for many years and works well in most
instances. There is value in keeping the current method in place
unless it is drastically broken. Second, our federalist system preserves
a state's ability to influence the business and affairs of corporations
maintaining headquarters within its borders. It "requires that states
respect other states' laws," and multijurisdictional litigation preserves
that ability.68 Third, Delaware courts have a quasi-monopoly over the
growth of corporate law, which affects public companies everywhere.
The current schema has the advantages of predictability and certainty
because competent judges with business experience preside over
corporate law cases. Yet, Delaware could stop balancing the interests
of shareholders and managers if it obtained a complete monopoly. 69
Multijurisdictional litigation gives other states' courts a channel to
articulate their state's interest in these cases and thereby influence
corporate law.70
On the cost side of the equation, a very limited amount of
empirical work of any type has been done on this topic, and none of it
has attempted to measure such important things as the direct impact
67. Id. at 1799.
68. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at 1106.
69. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1799-800 (describing the advantages posed
by the Delaware courts' quasi-monopoly over the future growth of corporate law).
70. Id. at 1800. Griffith and Lahav suggest two additional benefits: (1) multijurisdictional
litigation allows plaintiffs' lawyers to look for the jurisdiction with the most favorable procedural
rules in order to maximize their chances of success in the litigation and thereby increase the
value of their client's claim in settlement; and (2) multijurisdictional litigation provides
defendants with a structural advantage that allows them, effectively, to "shop" for the quickest




of multijurisdictional litigation on total attorneys' fees or settlements.
These direct costs are important but may be relatively small. First,
consider the defendants' costs for settling these cases. Many
shareholder deal cases are dismissed with very little litigation activity
and no settlement,71 whether or not filed in one or multiple
jurisdictions. For example, Cain and Davidoff report that in 2010
there were 124 deals over $100 million in value, and that 105 of these
deals involved litigation, resulting in a total of 75 settlements.72 In
other words, 30 cases, or about 28.5% of the total cases filed, were
dismissed without a settlement. For the cases that do settle, we do not
know if the individual settlements for deals involving
multijurisdictional litigation were higher than, lower than, or the
same as those for comparable deals where litigation was filed in one
court.73
Is there an increase in the total cost of settlements for all
target firms? While Delaware's dismissal rate is higher than other
jurisdictions, its courts dismiss fewer cases filed in multiple
jurisdictions. 7 4 Defendants' litigation costs could be higher if other
states are not dismissing these cases, because that would, in turn,
drive defendants to settle more multijurisdictional litigation.75
However, higher direct costs to defendants from individual
multijurisdictional settlements (such as greater deal-consideration
payments) are unlikely, because most of these settlements involve
increased disclosure to the class of affected shareholders, and not
increased deal consideration. Settling more cases, therefore, does not
lead to greater cash payments. Moreover, by settling more cases, the
defendants are obtaining more global releases from all potential
claims arising out of the transaction, and these additional releases
have value.76
Consider next the implications of multijurisdictional litigation
on total attorneys' fees paid. Multijurisdictional litigation could create
more mouths to feed in the plaintiffs' bar and therefore generate a
greater total amount of fee payments to plaintiffs' attorneys. While
71. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 1, at 176, 176 n.174.
72. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 1-3.
73. A much harder question would be whether, given the merits of the particular
multijurisdictional case, the settlements were higher or lower than would have been expected if
the litigation was filed in only one jurisdiction.
74. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 5-6 (noting that Delaware appears to be
dismissing fewer cases and that such behavior is consistent with conduct designed to recapture
litigation).
75. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1800 n.249.
76. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at 1094-95.
1942 [Vol. 66:6:1925
2013] MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DEAL LITIGATION
this could be true in particular cases, even when all of the cases are
filed in one court, there are generally several different plaintiffs' law
firms that assist in the litigation, each of which has a claim to a share
of any fee award. It is not clear why allowing a firm with a suit in
another jurisdiction to participate in the overall settlement fee
allocation is any different from what occurs when all of the cases are
in one court.
Defense counsel might also complain that if they are forced to
defend actions in two jurisdictions, then they will have to charge their
clients more. There are several problems with this argument. First,
there is no publicly available information about the attorneys' fees
that defendants pay, so we cannot make any empirical determination
about changes to them. If defendants would disclose such fees
systematically, then the issue could be studied empirically. Second,
deal litigation is not as lawyer intensive as most forms of litigation:
there are few significant motions filed, except for motions to expedite
discovery, and most cases are resolved quickly. Third, defendants can
run a reverse auction, whereby they have competing plaintiffs' counsel
filing cases in different jurisdictions, which should permit them to
drive settlement costs to the lowest level possible.77
Furthermore, the best empirical evidence shows that, in the
majority of deal cases, little discovery is taken.78 Interrogatories are
likely to be the same in each related case, or at least quite similar,
while depositions are frequently taken once for use in all of the
pending matters related to the transaction. Moreover, it is common
practice to conduct all discovery on a consolidated basis across
jurisdictions. Furthermore, most multijurisdictional cases are only
litigated in one forum because the judges and attorneys from each
court involved agree on which court should hear the case.79 Finally,
only one preliminary injunction hearing needs to be scheduled per
transaction. So while there are likely to be some increased defense
costs from having multiple courts involved in these cases, it is hard to
quantify them, and they may be relatively small.80
77. If objectors are paid off, then reverse auctions may have this effect. Griffith & Lahav,
supra note 48, at 1096 ("Collusive settlement, in other words, may be a real and pervasive threat
in merger litigation, leading the market for preclusion to systematically underprice shareholder
claims.").
78. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 1, at 189.
79. Comity between courts generally results in this type of agreement amongst judges, and
counsel is often able to work out such a schedule without judicial involvement.
80. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1800-01; see also Griffith & Lahav, supra note
48, at 1081 ("[W]hatever increase in the dollar cost of defense does come about as a result of
parallel merger litigation will be an increase on the margin and likely immaterial in terms of the
transaction as a whole.").
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An additional cost is each court's time and effort.
Multijurisdictional litigation by definition involves more than one
court, increasing the judiciary's cost. However, the courts' workload in
these cases is relatively light, as it is limited to managing the minimal
discovery motion practice, monitoring the selection of lead counsel,
and reviewing settlements. Most courts avoid the finer issues of
corporate law and civil procedure, so they will probably expend
relatively few resources on this litigation. And regardless, any
resources that are expended mostly belong to state courts that are
voluntarily assuming jurisdiction over a case that likely would
otherwise be litigated in the Delaware Chancery Court.
Defendants could point to the potentially increased uncertainty
of the outcome of deal litigation that results from giving plaintiffs a
choice of forum. This is not unique to deal litigation: any time that a
plaintiff can select the judge of their choice by taking advantage of
forum-selection options that are within the boundaries of existing
procedural and jurisdictional rules, there is a chance that they will get
a better outcome in their case. It is always possible that a judge from
Idaho, for example, might be more inclined to issue an injunction
stopping a multibillion-dollar deal than one from Delaware. Although
there is a small possibility of this happening, which may be worth
something in settlement value to plaintiffs, it would be a very rare
case indeed where it would occur. For one thing, deal-related
injunctions are infrequently issued by any court unless there are
competing bidders fighting over a single target (a rare occurrence
these days). Moreover, if defendants are right that M&A deal cases
have become much weaker over time, so that there are more frivolous
cases filed today than in decades past, then the likelihood of the
plaintiffs obtaining an injunction or otherwise delaying the completion
of a deal should have also declined commensurately over this time
period. In other words, defendants should have fewer worries about
uncertainty in case outcome.
More generally, though, a common refrain from the defense bar
is that all M&A deal litigation is frivolous. Whatever the merits of
such claims in the "golden" and "silver" eras of shareholder litigation,
the data from the current era are enough to give even strong
supporters of shareholder rights pause for reflection. One disturbing
trend can be seen in settlements in these cases. In the Fifth Merger
Wave, M&A shareholder-litigation settlements occurred in about one-
third of all cases filed.8 1 The underlying cases were largely based on
claims of substantive unfairness in the deal terms, such as
81. Krishnan et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 32).
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underpayment in sweetheart deals or favoritism in sale processes, and
resulted in increased deal-consideration payments to shareholders in
about 42% of the cases settled.82 For Delaware cases, only 10% of all
settlements were solely based on disclosure claims. 83
In more recent years, settlement percentages in Delaware have
gone from 48.7% of all M&A class actions filed in 2005 to 76.9% of all
such cases in 2012.84 These settlements are quite different from those
in the earlier time period, as they are generally based solely on
allegations of disclosure violations. For example, Cain and Davidoff
show that in 2005, disclosure-based settlements constituted 67% of all
settlements in deal litigation, but that by 2011, this figure had
increased to 84% of all settlements.85 In a related paper, the same
authors find that 52% of all cases filed settled in disclosure-based
settlements, while less than 5% of all cases filed settled with
consideration increases.
Does multijurisdictional litigation lead to more bad cases and
more strike-suit settlements? Yes, say some commentators. As
examples in support of this proposition, they have identified a number
of different situations in which multijurisdictional litigation may be
hurting the quality of M&A litigation as a whole. 86 For example,
defendants would normally oppose granting expedited discovery in a
case that is very weak on the merits if the litigation was in only one
forum. However, because a second, nearly identical complaint is filed
in a different forum, the defendants agree to actively support
discovery expedition in the first forum "in the absence of reasonable
certainty that the court in that other forum would abstain from
exercising jurisdiction."87 The defendants' decision to agree to
discovery could significantly increase discovery costs, thereby
increasing litigation expenses. While this situation is a problem, a
possible solution is for the first court to deny expedited discovery if the
judge believes the case is very weak. Other courts might well follow
suit if presented with the same request. However, if that does not
happen, then multijurisdictional litigation could create additional
discovery costs, although there is currently no way to quantify the size
of these costs or the number of cases in which they arise.
82. Id.
83. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 1, at 181.
84. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 5; Krishnan et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 32).
85. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 3-4.
86. These examples are taken from Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not
the First-Filed Complaint 17-25 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 740, 2013), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2200499.
87. Id. at 17-18.
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A second problem could occur with a reverse auction in a
meritorious case. The defendants can pressure a plaintiffs law firm in
the first jurisdiction into releasing all of its claims arising out of the
transaction by threatening to settle with a different plaintiffs law
firm in a second jurisdiction. This allows the defendants to cheaply
escape liability. If all the plaintiffs had been constrained to one forum,
the defendants would not have had the power to obtain such a result.88
Here, the real driver is the Matsushita decision, because it ensures
that defendants can obtain a global release from any plaintiffs law
firm that files a case. One answer would be to overrule Matsushita
legislatively, although Griffith and Lahav argue that it creates a
beneficial market for preclusion. 89 In any event, with Matsushita in
place, there is an unquantified cost to this type of reverse-auction
behavior, as it adversely affects meritorious cases challenging M&A
transactions. Again, though, without more data, it is hard to know
how frequently this scenario occurs or the impact that it has on any
particular case.
. A third problematic situation is when the threat of a second
firm filing first in another jurisdiction leads plaintiffs' counsel to forgo
doing a careful investigation and instead hastily file a poorly
researched action. The logic here is that if the second firm files first, it
may thereby gain the lead counsel position in its chosen jurisdiction
by virtue of the first-to-file preference. If the second firm's court of
choice ultimately gains control of the litigation, then the first
plaintiffs' firm may receive less compensation for its efforts. Again,
there are unquantifiable costs associated with this behavior, but the
best response is for all courts to give preference to well-researched
cases over poorly drafted ones, a response already in place in
Delaware that could be adopted easily elsewhere. Yet, it is worth
noting that some commentators claim that "many judges (both in
Delaware and California) have denied expedited discovery in merger
cases on the ground that the plaintiff waited too long after the deal
was announced to get to work,"90 suggesting that lengthy prefiling
88. One point to observe here is that the defendants' costs of litigating this case will be
significantly reduced because of the reverse auction. This could more than offset any increase in
discovery costs that are generated in the first example.
89. Griffith and Lahav might see this scenario as an example of how reverse auctions drive
down the value of cases, leading to more low value settlements that give defendants the
preclusion they are seeking. See generally Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48 (noting that reverse
auctions amount to a form of collusion in which defense and plaintiff attorneys work together to
undercompensate shareholder-claimants).
90. Boris Feldman, Litigating Post-Close Merger Cases, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 9, 2012, 10:12 AM), http:/Iblogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov
/2012/11/09/itigating-post-close-merger-cases/.
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fact-finding may hurt a plaintiffs' firm's chances in deal litigation,
even if there is only one forum available.
Another issue comes up if courts compete to hear these cases:
Plaintiffs' counsel has incentives to push for class certification and
lead counsel designation as quickly as possible in order to establish
control over deal litigation. Facing this pressure, a court that is
competing to keep these cases may, in order to keep the case, be
tempted to move too quickly to resolve these important procedural
questions without considering their subtleties. It is very hard to know
if judges engage in this behavior, explicitly or subconsciously. Even
though judges may benefit from the potential publicity of handling a
big case, this incentive to compete for cases is likely offset by most
judges' heavy workloads and huge backlogs. Of course, it is possible
that judges do engage in such behavior, and if so, then it costs society
in some unquantifiable amount.
One final problem involves a knowledgeable court that
recognizes the parties are proposing a weak settlement but is
unwilling to reject it for fear that the plaintiffs will pursue the case in
a second, less knowledgeable court in another jurisdiction that will
accept it. If this scenario plays out, then the corporation will suffer
harm from settling an unmeritorious case. However, if the first court
rejects the settlement in a well-reasoned and thoughtful opinion
explaining the weaknesses of the case, the second court should be able
to recognize the case's true weakness and respect the first court's
decision.
All five of these situations (and others) point out potential costs
of multijurisdictional litigation, some of which could be reduced by
taking other action, and all of which need to be quantified to give us a
better idea of their importance. But perhaps the most disturbing fact
about M&A litigation in the post-financial crisis period is that there
are so many disclosure-based settlements. Are these cases all weak?
Perhaps transactional lawyers have learned the lessons of Revlon so
well, given the numerous decisions on that subject, that there just are
not good claims to be made anymore in most deal litigation, so that
the cases filed today are just bad. Undoubtedly, there are some bad
deal cases out there. For those cases, the courts ought to increase their
scrutiny, especially where the plaintiffs' main claims are based solely
on disclosure.
The courts have several tools with which to do so. First, they
can deny plaintiffs' expedited-discovery requests when the case
appears frivolous. As pointed out in a recent article, "[e]liminating
expedited discovery effectively erases plaintiffs' primary leverage to
force pre-closing settlements" and thus reduces the risk of an
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injunction being issued.91 Alternatively, if defendants file a motion to
dismiss the case, a court could grant it. Even for cases that do settle,
the court could critically examine the amount of attorneys' fees
awarded and cut or reduce them, especially in disclosure-based
settlements.92 Finally, some defense counsel argue in favor of filing
summary judgment motions and even trying cases, at least
postmerger, as a way of combating potential abuses. 93 But if
defendants are unwilling to take such actions or the courts will not
dismiss these cases when asked to do so, then perhaps the cases are
not frivolous after all.
As recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions illustrate, we
must take care to avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water. In
re Southern Peru Copper Corporation Shareholder Derivative
Litigation,94 In re Del Monte Foods Company Shareholders
Litigation,95 and In re El Paso Corporation Shareholder Litigation96
are three enormously important victories for plaintiff shareholders
that the Chancery Court has decided within the last year. While their
facts are all different, the underlying lesson from all of these cases is
that shareholder litigation has an important monitoring function to
play in detecting and punishing parties that violate their fiduciary
and contractual duties to target company shareholders.
The Del Monte case is particularly illustrative of this point. As
Vice Chancellor Laster's opinion states, the case appeared to have
little merit when first filed, and the claims made were largely based
on alleged disclosure violations. Once the defendants issued
supplementary disclosures, thereby mooting the disclosure claims, the
case's prospects looked dim until discovery revealed that the board's
investment banker had "secretly and selfishly manipulated the sale
process to engineer a transaction that would permit [it] to obtain
lucrative buy-side financing fees."97 The judge went on to issue an
important opinion that set critical precedent relating to how
investment bankers should act in advising target boards of directors
in friendly transactions. But most importantly for our purposes, the
91. Richard H. Zelichov & Christina L. Costley, Stamping out Merger Objection Cases
Expedited Proceedings: A Privilege Not a Right, 27 BNA CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 288 (2012).
92. Some commentators have argued that the Delaware standard for awarding fees "can be
interpreted loosely or stringently to award or deny fees." Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at
1091.
93. Feldman, supra note 90.
94. 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011).
95. 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
96. 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
97. In re Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817.
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case shows that routine denial of expedited discovery requests in M&A
litigation would have adverse consequences both for target company
shareholders and Delaware law. Moreover, these cases show that
despite the costs associated with M&A litigation, it serves an
important function both as a deterrent to bad behavior and as a source
of guidance to practitioners about the appropriate rules of conduct in
transactional practice.
In short, while multijurisdictional litigation does create some
additional costs that need to be addressed, it also creates some
benefits. Unfortunately, we have relatively little information about
either. But based on the present data, it seems that the net costs
associated with this new form of multijurisdictional litigation could be
relatively small. Solutions that aim at fixing the multijurisdictional
problem should therefore be relatively inexpensive. The next section
surveys two possible policy solutions.
IV. FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES VS. COMITY
Forum-selection clauses and improved comity are the two main
policy responses that have been proposed to solve the increase in
multijurisdictional litigation.98 Forum-selection-clause proponents
focus on implementing corporate charter or bylaw provisions that
either require all shareholder suits to be heard in the Delaware
Chancery Court or give the defendant-company's board of directors the
option to litigate the case in Delaware or in its preferred jurisdiction.
Advocates of comity argue that the judges whose courts receive these
cases are best positioned to resolve amongst themselves which single
court ought to decide all of the cases arising out of the transaction. I
explore both sets of proposals below.
98. Thomas and Thompson, supra note 3, provide an extensive discussion of potential policy
choices, including coordinated state action to promulgate a uniform law on the subject. Professor
Edward Cooper recently pointed out to me that such a uniform law was released by the Uniform
Law Commission in 1991. Titled the "Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act," it was approved by the
American Bar Association on February 4, 1992. See UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT
(1992), available at http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Transfer%200f%2OLitigation%2OAct.
Unfortunately, not a single state has adopted it to date. The Act empowers a state court to
transfer a case to a court in another state if the court receiving the case consents to the transfer.
Id. at 7. The accepting court must have personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
1949
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A. Forum-Selection Clauses
Several practitioners99 and academics have written in support
of using forum-selection clauses to resolve which court ought to decide
multijurisdictional deal litigation. One well-known judge has urged
companies to adopt such clauses, saying that "if boards of directors
and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an
efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then
corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an
exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes."00
At present, though, only a small number of companies have
followed this advice.' 0 One threshold issue is whether such clauses
can be placed in the corporate bylaws, or whether they must be in the
charter. Some firms have put these provisions in their charters in
anticipation of an IPO,102 while a few others have submitted charter
amendments to a shareholder vote. Most firms that have adopted
forum-selection clauses, however, have done so in director-approved
bylaws.103 Undoubtedly, firms prefer to use board-initiated bylaws to
avoid the potential embarrassment of having their shareholders vote
down proposed charter amendments.104
99. For an important volume containing numerous articles by practicing lawyers on this
topic, see M&A LITIGATION 2011, supra note 46.
100. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 2010).
101. However, following Vice Chancellor Laster's pronouncement in Revlon that
"corporations could avoid forum dispute battles by adopting forum-selection clauses in their
corporate charters," Grundfest found that the number of corporations adopting forum-selection
clauses increased at a statistically significant rate. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and
Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 333, 339, 354, 404 (2012). Grundfest further found a "statistically significant acceleration" in
the adoption of intracorporate forum-selection clauses following the Chevron Corporation's
announcement on September 30, 2010, that its board of directors had amended its bylaws to
include such a provision. Id. at 354, 358. Based on the results of his study, Grundfest argues that
the data indicates a much larger number of publicly traded corporations could join this trend. Id.
at 360.
102. Some corporations have adopted these provisions before their IPO to eliminate the need
for shareholder approval. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN
CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 2, 4 (2012), available at http://www.ngelaw.com//files/ Uploads[Images/
StudyofDelawareForum012512.pdf (finding that charter amendments are being adopted by
corporations "as they go public, are spun-off, emerge from bankruptcy protection or reincorporate
in Delaware," thereby eliminating the necessity of shareholder approval); Grundfest, supra note
101, at 338-39.
103. ALLEN, supra note 102, at 3 (finding that 195 "exclusive" Delaware charter and bylaw
provisions had been adopted as of December 31, 2011, where an "exclusive" provision "generally
provide[s] for the Court of Chancery to be the sole and exclusive forum for enumerated categories
of actions"). Quinn argues that status quo bias is the reason for the infrequency of the adoption
of these provisions. Quinn, supra note 51, at 142.
104. ALLEN, supra note 102, at 2. While shareholders generally have the power to amend
corporate bylaws, there have only been four publicly disclosed attempts by shareholders to do so
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Forum-selection clauses limit the jurisdictions in which
shareholders can pursue representative litigation. Initially, these
clauses were generally mandatory in nature, requiring litigation to
proceed in the state of incorporation. More recently, however,
corporate boards have largely adopted clauses that give the
corporation's directors the option to select a court in the state of
incorporation or in the location of the company's headquarters.
Defendants can use such clauses to forum shop and could potentially
decide to force merger litigation out of the Delaware courts, or at least
pressure Delaware to become more management friendly by
threatening to do so.
There are several advantages to permitting charter or bylaw
forum-selection provisions. The most important one, and most obvious,
is that, by limiting shareholder litigation to (mostly) Delaware,
Delaware law will be consistently interpreted by the Delaware courts
and not by judges from other states. Delaware judges and lawyers
often complain that other jurisdictions do a poor job of applying
Delaware corporate law's highly nuanced fiduciary principles because
they are unfamiliar with those principles and have few opportunities
to learn about them.105 By comparison, the Delaware Chancery Court's
caseload is primarily corporate law cases, and many of its judges are
experienced corporate law practitioners. A clause that specifies the
Delaware Chancery Court or gives directors the option to choose that
court (which they are likely to take advantage of) will also reduce
duplicative lawsuit filings in other jurisdictions while maintaining a
convenient forum for both parties.
Second, advocates claim that forum-selection clauses will lead
to greater certainty in the outcomes of these cases. The Delaware
courts' experience and expertise makes it easier for practitioners to
predict the result in shareholder deal litigation: strong suits will lead
to bigger settlements, while weak ones will be dismissed. When other
judges are faced with these cases, it may lead to a wider variation of
results, so that some bad cases may suddenly take on great value. A
slight variation on this theme is that some judges in other
jurisdictions are elected judges who may, at least subconsciously, be
to date. Institutional Shareholder Service's voting policies for the 2012 proxy season advises
companies they will evaluate these "exclusive venue" provisions on a case-by-case basis, asking
whether the company in question has good corporate governance structures currently in place
and whether it has disclosed any material harm done to it by shareholder litigation in other
jurisdictions. INST. S'HOLDER SERVS. INC., U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY: 2012 UPDATES
13 (2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS_2012USUpdates2011117.pdf.
105. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1795 n.231.
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more likely to favor outcomes that benefit litigation counsel who have
contributed to their election campaigns.
Finally, proponents claim that these clauses are enforceable as
a matter of contract law. Charters are claimed to be contracts, and
forum-selection provisions, in general, are permissible as a matter of
contract law, so these particular types of clauses must also be
enforceable. Interestingly, this argument has been widely accepted for
LLCs, as courts have upheld strict contract constructions for LLC
articles of organization and operating agreements.106 However, as
discussed below, things are much less clear in the corporate context,
where fiduciary principles overlay the contractual underpinning of the
corporation's charter.
Despite these potential advantages, it is important to examine
the arguments against allowing these forum-selection provisions.
First, a strong push by Delaware for such clauses may spark a
backlash from other states, federal regulators, and plaintiffs' lawyers.
Delaware's insistence on being the sole interpreter of its law runs
counter to basic federalism principles. 107 Other states might retaliate
by enacting foreign-corporation-law statutes or by expanding the scope
of existing ones. They might also refuse to hear cases involving
Delaware corporations whenever possible, or otherwise discriminate
against them, which might discourage companies from initially
incorporating in Delaware.
One related question is whether jurisdictional or constitutional
issues prevent forum-selection clauses. In our existing federalist
system, citizens invoke the general jurisdiction of state courts to sue
defendants over whom that court has personal jurisdiction. No state
can divest another state from asserting such jurisdiction. Moreover,
federal law allows litigants to pursue a state-law claim in a federal
tribunal by using diversity jurisdiction, perhaps to avoid a perceived
hometown bias. Forum-selection clauses would prevent citizens from
making these choices for corporate law claims.108 Instead, these
106. Grundfest notes that courts have permitted "partners to have the broadest possible
discretion in drafting their partnership agreements." Grundfest, supra note 101, at 358.
Therefore, courts have invalidated partnership agreements only when the contractual provisions
are inconsistent with mandatory statutory provisions, which are more often intended to protect
third parties and not the contracting partners. Id.
107. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at 50 ("[Sltates are understandably reluctant to cede
all authority over what they consider to be in-state businesses merely because the organizational
documents are filed elsewhere.").
108. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting judiciary the authority to hear diversity cases); 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); see also Stevelman, supra note 51, at
131 ("[A]ny measures to limit shareholder-plaintiffs' otherwise legitimate access to the federal
courts would almost certainly prove unconstitutional.").
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clauses generally permit defendants to funnel all cases to sympathetic
state courts in the state of the corporation's headquarters. There is
value in letting plaintiffs bring suit against defendants in jurisdictions
with which they have significant contacts and permitting parties to
have access to federal courts as a response to possible home-court
discrimination.
Second, plaintiffs' lawyers would undoubtedly look for ways
around these forum-selection clauses, perhaps by choosing to file
alternative claims in other states' courts or purely federal claims in
the federal courts. Other states' courts could also refuse to enforce
forum-selection clauses on a variety of grounds, some of which are
discussed below. This would lead to significant collateral litigation in
these representative actions, as plaintiffs would make claims that the
clauses impinge on shareholders' fundamental right to enforce
directors' and officers' fiduciary duties. It seems likely that, despite
Delaware corporate law's importance nationwide, judges in other
jurisdictions may push back against the idea that Delaware courts
occupy a privileged position in interpreting it. If a split in the courts
developed, then the U.S. Supreme Court could get involved, 109 with
unpredictable consequences for Delaware's continued quasi-monopoly
in corporate law. Additionally, the federal government could well
decide that it no longer needs to carve out Delaware class actions and
derivative suits from the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA")no or the
PSLRA11 and that federal regulation would be the simplest solution
to the multijurisdictional litigation problem.
Third, there are substantive reasons to think that these clauses
are unenforceable. The first of these is the issue of shareholder
consent, especially as to management-imposed bylaws. Director-
adopted bylaws do not have express shareholder consent. This fact
seemed important to Vice Chancellor Laster when he endorsed forum-
selection clauses because he expressly referred to action by both
"directors and shareholders" in adopting "charter" provisions, 112
109. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (indicating that a state court's
particularly egregious distortion of another state's law could violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
110. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (2012)
(explaining that a claim relating to the internal governance of a corporation may not be removed
to federal court if the claim arises under the laws of a state in which the corporation is
incorporated).
111. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227, 3228 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preserving certain
state-law actions based upon the law of the state in which the corporation is organized).
112. ALLEN, supra note 102, at 6 (reporting that 96.9% of forum-selection clauses were
proposed or adopted after Vice Chancellor Laster's statement in Revlon).
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highlighting the importance of shareholder approval. A similar
concern was raised in the first case deciding this issue, Galaviz V.
Berg, where a federal district court rejected a forum-selection clause
that required all shareholder derivative actions to be brought in the
Delaware Chancery Court."13 There, the defendants moved to dismiss
the case for improper venue, defending their motion by claiming that
the bylaw provision was enforceable under contract law. The
defendants' argument was undermined by the fact that the board had
unilaterally adopted the bylaw only after the plaintiff brought the
derivative action claiming that the directors had breached their
fiduciary duties. The federal court found the contract analogy
unsupported because the directors' bylaw lacked the requisite mutual
consent.114
Nor is the contract-law analogy conclusive. It is true that
forum-selection clauses are widely found in corporate contracts 15 and
that a court will generally enforce those agreements under the
applicable contract law." 6 However, forum-selection clauses that
implicate the relationship between shareholders and managers raise
questions about their effect on the management's fiduciary duties to
shareholders. In more theoretical terms, forum-selection clauses
implicate corporate governance and disadvantage shareholder efforts
to engage in rigorous monitoring of management agency costs.
Contracting to weaken corporate law fiduciary duties in public
companies is permitted in some contexts but not in others. For
example, Delaware corporate law permits corporations to ask
shareholders to approve charter provisions that exculpate directors for
breaches of the duty of care.117 However, it is also quite clear that such
exculpatory clauses do not extend to violations of the duty of good
faith or the duty of loyalty. 18 On a national level, midstream dual
class recapitalizations have been prohibited, even when approved by
113. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("[T]he venue provision
was unilaterally adopted by the directors who are defendants in this action, after the majority of
the purported wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred, and without the consent of existing
shareholders who acquired their shares when no such bylaw was in effect.").
114. Id. at 1174-75.
115. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006).
116. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1972) (holding that a
venue provision in a freely negotiated contract should not be set aside absent a strong showing
that either enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause was invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching).
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 1999).
118. Id.
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shareholders, because they increase managerial "agency costs.119
Forum-selection provisions are likely to negatively impact
shareholders' ability to bring suits to enforce managers' fiduciary
duties as well, but how much and whether they will substantially
increase managerial agency costs can be debated.
Overall, charter and bylaw provisions are not the best solution
for multijurisdictional litigation for all of the above reasons, as well as
several others. For instance, forum-selection clauses are nothing more
than forum shopping by defendants. Why should we privilege
defendants to choose the forum for shareholder litigation rather than
plaintiffs? Our litigation system makes many trade-offs in allocating
power to plaintiffs or defendants. Reallocating forum choice to
defendants is a fundamental change that would require shifting more
power to plaintiffs in other ways, none of which defendants are likely
to be willing to consider.
Moreover, the most popular form of these provisions is a
director-imposed bylaw. Advocates argue that shareholders generally
have the power to amend any director-passed bylaws, so they have
little need to fear self-interested director conduct. 120 This argument
seems to ignore the substantial collective action problems that
shareholders face in any ballot initiative, especially one that does not
involve takeover defenses. Furthermore, even if shareholders
succeeded in overcoming these problems, management could reverse
any shareholder-passed bylaw under most states' law. In other words,
unilateral director bylaw action is essentially irreversible.
Shareholder-approved charter amendments are better, but still
fraught with difficulty. While a shareholder vote provides some
protection to investors, they still face significant collective action
problems in opposing such provisions. It is true that third-party voting
advisors will issue voting recommendations to help overcome
shareholder collective action problems. 121 However, if there are
collective action problems and strategic-choice issues, shareholder
approval of charter amendments does not necessarily mean the
119. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL § 313(A) (2013)
(stating that "[v]oting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock ... cannot
be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance"), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMISections/.
120. This claim is particularly suspect when directors are adopting such amendments after
they have been sued for alleged misconduct or when they adopt bylaws that give the board the
discretion to select one forum among a group of potential forums once shareholder litigation has
been filed.
121. ISS has issued voting guidelines to its clients concerning forum-selection clauses. See
INST. S'HOLDER SERVS. INC., supra note 104, at 13 (directing clients to vote on forum-selection
clauses on a case-by-case basis while taking listed factors into account).
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amendments increase shareholder wealth, at least in the context of
dual class recapitalizations.122 Forum-selection clauses may pose
similar problems, although it is too soon to tell if these problems will
develop.
Finally, forum-selection provisions create a lock-in effect.123
They are generally written to give boards the power to force plaintiffs
to sue them in Delaware.124 If that occurs, it is not beyond imagination
that the Delaware courts could develop hostility to these cases.125 In
other words, while the Delaware judges currently do an excellent job
balancing investor and management interests, this could change,
leaving shareholders without effective recourse for management
wrongdoing. This weighs against permitting corporate forum-selection
provisions.
B. Comity-Tweaking the Current System
A promising alternative solution is comity between courts. The
Delaware courts have already had some experience with this judicially
based solution. Chancellor William Chandler of the Delaware
Chancery Court developed a practice in multijurisdictional deal
litigation of contacting the other judge(s) in courts with pending
litigation from the same transaction to discuss which forum was the
most appropriate for the litigation to proceed. If practiced effectively
by judges and agreed to by counsel, multijurisdictional cases can be
litigated in one forum. 126
At this practice's best, judges will weigh important factors to
decide which court is most appropriate to handle the case such as
their courts' docket backlog, their subject matter expertise, the
relative quality of the cases filed, the attorneys' ability to effectively
pursue the litigation, and their jurisdiction's interest in the defendant-
corporation's affairs. If appropriately used, judicial comity is an
efficient mechanism for reallocating multijurisdictional litigation
122. In that context, Gordon claims that management may tie the recapitalization to an
unrelated dividend sweetener or threaten to take action adverse to shareholder interests if their
proposal is defeated.
123. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1817.
124. ALLEN, supra note 102, at 3.
125. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("There
are sound policy reasons for this Court to police against shirking by representative counsel.").
126. Federal courts may be able to do the same in a somewhat different manner: a federal
court could abstain under the Colorado River doctrine from hearing federal proxy claims and
breach of fiduciary duty claims in favor of a Delaware action raising similar claims under
Delaware law. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who
Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 16, 45 (2012).
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between state courts. 127 Importantly, courts can implement judicial
comity without changing the existing litigation system.
This practice, of course, is not without problems. First, not all
judges, nor all attorneys, will participate effectively. There can be
defections, and there is no surefire policing mechanism. Comity may
at times result in diverting cases inefficiently, for example, if a
particular judge wants to preside over a high-profile case. Even if
conducted in good faith, though, judges may still simply disagree
about the proper forum, leaving two cases proceeding on the same
transaction at the same time.
Second, corporate litigation poses a special challenge to comity
because Delaware corporate law is effectively exported to the rest of
the country. Delaware can legitimately claim that it has a special
interest in the consistency of its law, which may suffer injury if other
states' courts take license with it. At the same time, other states have
strong interests in the affairs of their own locally based corporations,
especially when change-of-control transactions may adversely affect
these companies. 1 28 Balancing these states' competing interests falls
outside the traditional boundaries of federalism into an evolving area
of jurisprudence. 1 29
Comity's great virtue is its relatively low-cost, easily reversible
policy approach that does not require any remarkable changes to the
current system. It is flexible and permits judges to weigh whether the
interests of their jurisdiction and local corporations require having
shareholder litigation resolved in their courts as opposed to elsewhere.
Until better evidence is developed about the costs and benefits of
multijurisdictional litigation, comity is likely the best solution.
Griffith and Lahav have made some interesting suggestions
about how to improve the current system. 30 First, they advocate for a
change in the Delaware Chancery Court's practice of releasing
127. Id. at 16-17 ("By and large, such motion practice has been successful .... ).
128. In this bargain for jurisdiction between two states with equally compelling interests,
Winship argues that the effectiveness of comity and reciprocity depends on whether a state has
something to trade. Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction (Ill. Pub.
L. Research Paper No. 11-21, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=2046552. For example, California has something to trade because many corporations
choose to headquarter there. Id. Therefore, California can decline "to exercise jurisdiction in the
expectation that other states would do the same for its corporations." Id. This is in contrast to a
state like Delaware, which has few corporations physically located within its borders and
therefore little opportunity to hear cases about nondomestic entities. Id. Thus, while Delaware
courts acknowledge the importance of comity in allocating cases among states, Delaware is not
positioned to effectively bargain for exclusive jurisdiction with other states. Id.
129. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 48, at 50-52 (developing a more robust theory of
federalism in the M&A litigation context).
130. Id. at 65-77.
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important precedent in forms that are not widely disseminated.131
They claim that the Delaware Chancery Court's precedent is widely
used by other courts, so the Court should start using traditional case
reporters or modern digital databases for its important precedent to
ensure accessibility.132 Next, Griffith and Lahav focus on providing
notice to judges in different jurisdictions hearing the same dispute. 133
They suggest that defendants should provide notice to all courts
involved since defendants are in the best position "to provide the
judges in each jurisdiction with a copy of the related complaint filed
elsewhere." 134 Third, Griffith and Lahav call for "instituting guidelines
for informal comity communications." 13 6 This would facilitate
communication amongst the various judges that have
multijurisdictional cases pending in front of them.13 6 Lastly, Griffith
and Lahav propose creating a means for sister states to formally
certify questions to the Delaware Chancery Court.137 They argue that,
by establishing official lines of communication, the judiciary can better
take advantage of the benefits provided by the market for preclusion.
Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court and his
coauthors have also endorsed comity as the most feasible solution to
the multijurisdictional litigation problem, although they would add a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the court whose law is being
applied.138 In corporate law cases, this would mean that the courts in
the state of incorporation, frequently Delaware, should decide the case
unless either another jurisdiction had a "supervening public interest"
or other "compelling circumstances" existed. The authors' justification
is straightforward: "Giving the parties' choice of law greater
significance in evaluating choice of forum promotes the consistent
application of relevant doctrine, by allowing the courts that are
authoritative in that law to adjudicate the case."139 They further argue
131. Id. at 65-68.
132. Id. at 67.
133. Id. at 68-70.
134. Id. at 69.
135. Id. at 65, 70-74.
136. Id. at 71.
137. Id. at 74-77. Likewise, Winship suggests that certification allows a lawsuit to be broken
down into legal issues in an effort to accommodate competing state interests. Winship, supra
note 128, at 94. Using the procedural posture of Scully v. Nighthawk as an example, Winship
argues that "Delaware might have an interest in determining the content of its law, but Arizona
might have an interest in adjudicating cases against corporations headquartered there." Id.
Therefore, splitting adjudication could serve both states' interests: Delaware could certify all
questions of Delaware law, while Arizona could adjudicate the matter. Id.
138. Strine et al., supra note 86, at 4.
139. Id. at 4
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that this presumption would enhance judicial efficiency, as it would
reduce the time that overburdened judges spend learning foreign
law. 140 If courts effectively implemented this approach, it would result
in the Delaware Chancery Court deciding most M&A deal litigation.
In short, the existing system of comity, with perhaps a few
tweaks, is effective in dealing with the vast majority of
multijurisdictional cases. For sure, there are occasional cases, like In
re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation,141 where more than one court
assumes jurisdiction over a case arising out of the same transaction.
But those appear to be the exception, not the rule.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A lot remains to be determined about the future of
multijurisdictional litigation.-The Delaware courts may well end the
fight between forum-selection clauses and comity in the coming
months. The Chancery Court issued an important decision in two
combined cases, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron
and Iclub Investment Partnership v. Fedex Corp., that addresses many
of the issues discussed in this article. 142 In that decision, Chancellor
Strine ruled that forum-selection clauses in corporate bylaws are
enforceable. 143 As a result, the battleground over these clauses is
likely to shift to courts in other jurisdictions. While it is difficult to
predict what the Delaware Supreme Court will do, other states' courts
are less likely to be hospitable to the defense bar's efforts to deprive
them of jurisdiction over cases that affect prominent local industries.
In the event of a judicial split on the matter, it seems likely that the
U.S. Supreme Court or Congress could step in to decide the issue.
Such action could threaten Delaware's preeminence in corporate law
far more than the current system's smattering of other state courts'
interpretations of Delaware law.
The corporate ballot box is likely to become an important
location for efforts for and against the implementation of these
clauses. Some Chevron shareholders have already filed a Rule 14a-8
140. In the traditional comity analysis, the authors also would deemphasize the importance
of being the first-filed case. Id. at 8.
141. In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961 (Del. Ch. 2007).
142. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
143. Id. Interestingly, a carbon copy of the Chevron case was filed in federal court in
Northern California shortly after it was filed in Delaware. Bushansky v. Armacost, No. C 12-
1597, 2012 WL 3276937 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012). That action was stayed in response to a motion
by the defendants based on the Delaware courts' ability and interest in resolving the issues at
stake in the litigation.
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proposal asking that its board of directors remove the bylaw that it
installed without a shareholder vote. Institutional Shareholder
Services, the leading proxy voting advisor, has also issued voting
recommendations on any proposed charter amendments or
shareholder-approved bylaw amendments that may surface in the
coming months. 144 There will undoubtedly be some spirited skirmishes
at annual meetings this coming spring.
In the meanwhile, more empirical research is needed to inform
the continuing debate. Unsubstantiated assertions of high costs for
defendants need to be tested with real data.145 Claims of reverse
auctions, elevated attorneys' fees for defendants, declining quality of
cases, and increased settlement leverage are, to this point,
undocumented. Until some of these questions are resolved, it seems
prudent to respond to multijurisdictional filings through our existing
system of comity, perhaps with a few slight modifications as discussed
above. But absent more complete data, policymakers should be slow to
take further action.
144. INST. S'HOLDER SERV. INC., 2013 U.S. PROxY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 7 (2013),
available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelinesl3l2Ol3.pdf.
145. The need for further disclosure of attorneys' fees for defense counsel is a topic that the
SEC might well want to consider given the important corporate governance implications of
forum-selection clauses.
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